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Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VAppeasement of General Franco during the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the development of British non-intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-39). Previous studies have focused heavily on pro-rebel or anti-
Republican sentiments among British officials in London and abroad, and often 
DSSO\ WKH WHUP µPDOHYROHQW QHXWUDOLW\¶ WR the motives behind the policy. 
However, utilising records from the National Archives as well as private papers, 
this article evaluates British non-intervention within the context of appeasement 
and demonstrates a clear link between the two policies.%\H[DPLQLQJ%ULWLVK
QHXWUDOLW\ WKURXJK WKH OHQV RI DSSHDVHPHQW WKLV VWXG\ ZLOO HQKDQFH RXU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI %ULWLVK GLSORPDF\ LQ WKH V DQG WKH OLQNV EHWZHHQ QRQ
LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ6SDLQDQGWKHJURZLQJWKUHDWRIIDVFLVPLQ(XURSH It argues that 
the British Government adopted and maintained a policy of strict neutrality in 
order to avoid an escalation of the conflict and to place itself in a better position 
from which it could establish a good relationship with whichever side emerged 
victorious. As it became increasingly clear that the rebels were going to 
overthrow the Republic, the British Government began to tacitly appease 
General Franco in an attempt to avoid a hostile Spain in the build up to the 
Second World War.  
 
Keywords: Appeasement; Non-Intervention; Neville Chamberlain; Franco; 
Anglo-Spanish Relations 
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Introduction 
The 1930s in Spain were stained by political upheaval and violence. The downfall of the Primo 
de Rivera dictatorship in 1930, followed soon after by the abdication of Alfonso XIII and the 
proclamation of the Spanish Second Republic on 14 April 1931, set in motion the political 
polarisation that would ultimately lead to civil war in 1936. After six years of political 
instability, with the reforms of the Republic drilling fear into the Right and not going far enough 
for many of those on the Left, a military rebellion was launched on 17 July 1936 that aimed to 
quickly overthrow the Republican Government and put in its place a conservative government 
that looked after the interests of the Army, the Church and the landowners at the expense of 
the poorer sectors within Spanish society.1 What was supposed to be a rapid military 
insurrection became three years of civil war entangling Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet 
Union and thousands of international volunteers.   
In the first few days of the conflict, it was not entirely clear what would become of the 
rebellion. The Republican Government managed to supress it in many major towns and cities, 
including Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona, and maintained control of major lines of 
communication and industry.2 The British Government adopted a wait-and-see approach, but 
decided within a matter of days that it would not become involved in the conflict.3 The French 
Government, on the other hand, initially planned to aid the Republic. However, after Leon 
Blum, the French Prime Minister, visited London between 23 and 25 July, French policy was 
altered to one of neutrality.4 Stanley Baldwin, the British Prime Minister, reportedly told Blum 
                                                          
1
 Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution, 2nd edn. (London: 
Routledge, 1994) 74-160, 211-75; Julio Gil Pecharromán, Historia de la Segunda Republica Española, 1931-
1936 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002), 161-196, 208-220. 
2
 Anthony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, revised edn. (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 2006), 55-70. 
3
 Cabinet Conclusions, 22 July 1936 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office] CAB 
23/85/7; Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 19. 
4
 This change in policy was due partly to British pressure and to internal political problems in France, see Enrique 
Moradiellos, Neutralidad benévola: El Gobierno británico y la insurrección militar española de 1936 (Oviedo: 
Pentalfa, 1990) 211-13; David Carlton, µ(GHQ %OXP DQG WKH 2ULJLQV RI 1RQ-,QWHUYHQWLRQ¶ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 6, 3 (1971) 40-55; Glyn Stoneµ%ULWDLQ1RQ-,QWHUYHQWLRQDQGWKH6SDQLVK&LYLO:DU¶
European Studies Review, 9 (1979) 129-149. 
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during the visit that if French intervention in Spain provoked a conflict with Italy, Britain would 
remain neutral.5 
First and foremost, neutrality was perceived as the best means of preventing the conflict 
from escalating into a wider European war. Secondly, the British Government recognised the 
strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula and the dangers of this being utilised by the fascist 
powers in the future. Utilising the peninsula would have been rendered easier if a government 
hostile to the British and friendly towards these fascist states came to power in Spain. A UHSRUW
LVVXHGE\WKH%ULWLVK&KLHIVRI6WDIILQ$XJXVWVWDWHGWKDW%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWVLQWKHFLYLO
ZDUZHUHWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIµWKHWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\RI6SDLQDQGKHUSRVVHVVLRQV¶DQGµRIVXFK
UHODWLRQVZLWKDQ\6SDQLVK*RYHUQPHQWZKLFKPD\HPHUJHIURPWKLVFRQIOLFWDVZLOOHQVXUH
EHQHYROHQWQHXWUDOLW\LQWKHHYHQWRIRXUEHLQJHQJDJHGLQD(XURSHDQZDU¶67RDFKLHYHWKLV
DQ RIILFLDO 1RQ,QWHUYHQWLRQ$JUHHPHQW ZDV UHDGLO\ DFFHSWHG E\ WKH %ULWLVK ZKHQ LW ZDV
SURSRVHG E\ WKH )UHQFK *RYHUQPHQW HDUOLHU LQ$XJXVW D ZHHN DIWHU /HRQ %OXP¶V YLVLW WR
/RQGRQ7$QWKRQ\ (GHQ WKH %ULWLVK )RUHLJQ VHFUHWDU\ ZHOFRPHG WKH SURSRVDO DV WKH EHVW
PHDQV RI DYRLGLQJ µDQ\ ULVN RI WKH FRPSOLFDWLRQV ZKLFK PLJKW DULVH ZHUH DVVLVWDQFH WR EH
DIIRUGHGIURPRXWVLGH6SDLQWRDQ\RIWKHSDUWLHVHQJDJHGLQWKHSUHVHQWFRQIOLFW¶87KLVFRQFHSW
RIHQVXULQJEHQHYROHQWQHXWUDOLW\EHFDPHWKHFHQWUDOWKHPHLQ%ULWDLQ¶VGHYHORSLQJSURJUDPPH
RIDSSHDVHPHQWWRZDUGVWKH6SDQLVKUHEHOV 
'HVSLWHEHLQJVLJQDWRULHVRIWKH1RQ,QWHUYHQWLRQ$JUHHPHQWWKH*HUPDQDQG,WDOLDQ
*RYHUQPHQWVVXSSOLHGDLGWRWKHUHEHOVZKRVW\OHGWKHPVHOYHVDVWKH6SDQLVK1DWLRQDOLVWV
WKURXJKRXW WKHFRQIOLFWDQGKHOSHGWRVHFXUHLQHDUO\WKHYLFWRU\RI*HQHUDO)UDQFLVFR
)UDQFRZKRLQ2FWREHUKDGEHFRPHWKHOHDGHURIUHEHO6SDLQ9 ,QWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHG
                                                          
5
 Jill Edwards, The British Government & The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1979), 16. 
6
 Committee of Imperial Defence report, 26 Aug.1936, F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 371/20535, W 9708/62/41; 
Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, 24 Aug. 1936, CAB 53/28. 
7
 Alpert, 40-56; Before visiting London, the French Government had planned on aiding the Republic but 
subsequently decided against doing so. 
8
 Eden to Cambon, 4 Aug. 1936, FO 371/20527, W 7504/62/41. 
9
 2Q,WDOLDQLQWHUYHQWLRQVHH3DXO3UHVWRQµ,WDO\DQG6SDLQLQ&LYLO:DUDQG:RUOG:DU-¶LQ6HEDVWLDQ
Balfour and Paul Preston (eds), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Routledge, 
1999) 151-184; John Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University 
3UHVVRQ*HUPDQLQWHUYHQWLRQVHH&KULVWLDQ/HLW]µ1D]L*HUPDQ\DQG)UDQFRLVW6SDLQ-¶LQ
Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (eds), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, (New York: 
Routledge, 1999) 185-207; Stanley Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War Two (Newhaven: 
Yale University Press, 2008). 
5 
 
UHSRUW LVVXHG E\ WKH &KLHIV RI 6WDII DQ\ NLQG RI DOOLDQFH EHWZHHQ 6SDLQ DQG ,WDO\ ZDV
FRQVLGHUHGWREHGHWULPHQWDOWR%ULWLVKLQWHUHVWVDQGLWVWDWHGWKDW,WDOLDQLQWHUYHQWLRQLQVXSSRUW
RIWKHUHEHOVµZRXOGSUHFLSLWDWHDPDMRULQWHUQDWLRQDOFULVLV¶10 
7KHOLWHUDWXUHRQ%ULWLVKSROLF\LQ6SDLQKDVRYHUZKHOPLQJO\DUJXHGWKDWQHXWUDOLW\ZDV
DGRSWHG EHFDXVH RI SURUHEHO V\PSDWKLHV DQG IHDUV WKDW D YLFWRU\ IRU WKH 5HSXEOLFDQ
*RYHUQPHQWZRXOGUHVXOWLQDFRPPXQLVWUHJLPHRQWKH,EHULDQ3HQLQVXOD7KXVVWDUYLQJWKH
5HSXEOLFDQ*RYHUQPHQWRIPLOLWDU\DLGZRXOGSDYHWKHZD\IRUDYLFWRU\IRUWKHUHEHOVDQG
HQVXUHWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDUHJLPHLQ6SDLQWKDWZDVPRUHLQ OLQHZLWK%ULWLVKLQWHUHVWV11
7KHUHZHUHFHUWDLQO\PDQ\&RQVHUYDWLYHVWKDWVDZWKLVDVRQHEHQHILWRIWKHQRQLQWHUYHQWLRQ
SROLF\DQGLWLVWUXHWKDWVLQFHWKHSRWHQWLDOVSUHDGRIFRPPXQLVPKDGEHHQDFRQVWDQW
VRXUFHRIDQ[LHW\IRUVXFFHVVLYH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWV127KHHYLGHQFHRIDOLQNEHWZHHQDPRUH
JHQHUDOIHDURIWKHVSUHDGRIFRPPXQLVPDQGDIHDURIDFRPPXQLVWUHJLPHLQ6SDLQDQGWKXV
LWVLQIOXHQFHRQ%ULWLVKSROLF\KRZHYHULVVRPHZKDWOLPLWHG13 
                                                          
10
 CAB 53/28, 24 Aug. 1936. 
11
 This is the most prominent interpretation among historians who have written on Britain and the Spanish Civil 
War, for examples, see Edwards, British Government0DULD7KRPDVµ7KH)URQW/LQHRI$OELRQ¶V3HUILG\Inputs 
LQWRWKH0DNLQJRI3ROLF\7RZDUGV6SDLQ7KH5DFLVPDQG6QREEHU\RI1RUPDQ.LQJ¶International Journal of 
Iberian Studies, 20, 2 (2007) 105-127 (105-108); Angel Viñas, La Soledad de la Republica: El abandono de las 
democracias y el viraje hacia la Unión Soviética (Barceolna: Critica, 2006), 64-70; Enrique Moradiellos, La 
perfidia de Albión: el gobierno británico y la guerra civil española (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1996). Others have 
IRFXVHGRQWKHLGHDRIµSHUILGLRXV$OELRQ¶EXWKDYHQRWQHFHVVDULO\DUJXHGLQIDYRXURIWKHµPDOHYROHQWQHXWUDOLW\¶
interpretation, see $QGHUVRQ3HWHUµ6FDQGDODQG'LSORPDF\7KH8VHRI0LOLWDU\7ULEXQDOVWR.HHSWKH)UDQFRLVW
5HSUHVVLRQ $IORDW 'XULQJ WKH &LYLO :DU¶ LQ Mass Killings and Violence in Spain, 1936-1952, ed. by Peter 
Anderson and Miguel Angel del Arco Blanco (New York: Routledge, 2015) 72-89; Glyn Stoneµ%ULWDLQ)UDQFH
DQGWKH6SDQLVK3UREOHP¶LQDecisions and Diplomacy: Essays in Twentieth Century International History, ed. 
by Dick Richardson and Glyn Stone (London: Routledge, 1994) 96-120. For good overviews of non-intervention 
in appeasement studies, see R.A.C Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the 
Second World War (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993); Paul Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
12
 N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators, 1935-1940 (London: 
Routledge, 1997) pp. 36-27, 78-80; Lawrence R Pratt, East of Malta, :HVWRI 6XH] %ULWDLQ¶V0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 74. 
13
 It is true that both Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain possessed such fears. However, British policy in 
Spain was determined more by the Foreign Office than by Baldwin himself. See Anthony Eden, The Eden 
Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), 401-3; Kenneth Young, Stanley Baldwin (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 140-41. Neville Chamberlain took a much more active role in foreign policy, 
but his anti-communisW VHQWLPHQWV ZHUH GULYHQ ODUJHO\ E\ KLV GRXEWV RI 5XVVLD¶V UHOLDELOLW\ DQG WKH ORVV RI
sympathy among smaller states such as Poland and Finland that might have resulted from an alliance with the 
Soviet Union. See Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1946), 325; Robert Self, 
Neville Chamberlain: A Biography (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 366-67. 
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(QULTXH 0RUDGLHOORV DQG 'RXJODV /LWWOH KDYH ZULWWHQ RQ WKLV LGHD RI µPDOHYROHQW
QHXWUDOLW\¶ LQGHWDLO EXW LQGRLQJ VRKDYHRYHUO\ QHJOHFWHG ZLGHU %ULWLVK VWUDWHJLF FRQFHUQV
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHSROLF\RIJHQHUDODSSHDVHPHQW14:KLOHPDQ\%ULWLVKRIILFLDOVERWKLQ/RQGRQ
DQGWKRVHSUHVHQWLQ6SDLQGXULQJWKHFRQIOLFWZHUHYHKHPHQWO\DQWL5HSXEOLFDQRUKHOGSUR
UHEHOV\PSDWKLHVWKHVHDWWLWXGHVVKRXOGQRWEHDVVXPHGWRKDYHEHHQWKHGHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRULQ
%ULWLVKGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ,QGHHGLQWKHEXLOGXSWRWKH)HEUXDU\HOHFWLRQLQ6SDLQZKLFK
VDZWKHYLFWRU\RIWKH3RSXODU)URQWWKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWKDGGLVPLVVHGULJKWZLQJIHDUVRI
FRPPXQLVP DQG PDLQWDLQHG WKDW %ULWLVK SROLF\ ZDV µQRW WR LQYROYH RXUVHOYHV LQ LQWHUQDO
6SDQLVKSROLWLFV¶15 
7KLVDUWLFOHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW%ULWLVKQHXWUDOLW\LQ6SDLQRXJKWWREHVHHQDVDVWUDQGRI
WKHZLGHUSROLF\RIJHQHUDODSSHDVHPHQWUDWKHUWKDQDVDSROLF\SXWLQSODFHWRLQGLUHFWO\DLGD
UHEHO YLFWRU\ RU DV DQ DWWHPSW WR WKZDUW WKH VSUHDG RI FRPPXQLVP %\ H[DPLQLQJ %ULWLVK
QHXWUDOLW\WKURXJKWKHOHQVRIDSSHDVHPHQWWKLVVWXG\ZLOOHQKDQFHRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI%ULWLVK
GLSORPDF\LQWKHVDQGWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQQRQLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ6SDLQDQGWKHJURZLQJWKUHDW
IURP+LWOHUDQG0XVVROLQL ,QGHHGKLVWRULDQVZKRKDYHIRFXVHGRQ$QJOR6SDQLVKUHODWLRQV
GXULQJWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DUKDYHVKRZQKRZDSROLF\RIQRQLQWHUYHQWLRQFRQWLQXHGLQ6SDLQ
DIWHUWKHFLYLOZDUDVDPHDQVRIDSSHDVLQJ)UDQFREHFDXVHRIZLGHUVWUDWHJLFFRQFHUQV16%XW
WKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHGRHVQRWPDNHFOHDUWKDWWKLVSURJUDPPHRIDSSHDVHPHQWZDVQRWDQHZ
UHDFWLRQWR)UDQFR¶VYLFWRU\EXWUDWKHUDFRQWLQXDWLRQRISUHYLRXVSROLFLHV,QWKLVUHJDUGWKH
DSSHDVHPHQW RI )UDQFR FRPHV LQWR IRFXV QRW DV D SXUHO\ WDFWLFDO FRQFHUQ GXULQJ (XURSH¶V
                                                          
14
 Douglas Little, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain and the Origins of the Spanish Civil 
War (London: Cornell University Press, 1985); 'RXJODV /LWWOH µ5HG 6FDUH  $QWL-Bolshevism and the 
Origins of British Non-,QWHUYHQWLRQLQWKH6SDQLVK&LYLO:DU¶Journal of Contemporary History, 23, 2 (1988) 
291-311 (pp. 310-(QULTXH0RUDGLHOORVµ%ULWLVK3ROLWLFDO6WUDWHJy in the face of the Military Rising of 1936 
LQ6SDLQ¶Contemporary European History, 1, 2 (1992) 123-137 (136-DOVRVHH(QULTXH0RUDGLHOORVµ7KH
Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Anglo-6SDQLVK5HODWLRQVLQ(DUO\¶European 
History Quarterly, 21:339 (1991) 339-364 (340-345, 359-361). 
15
 Doc. 174, W 11051/18/41 in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print, Part II: From the First to the Second World War, Vol. 26:  Spain, June 1931-June 1936, 
Anthony Adamthwaite (ed), 221-222; Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 61-71. 
16
 See Denis Smyth, Diplomacy and 6WUDWHJ\ RI 6XUYLYDO %ULWLVK 3ROLF\ DQG )UDQFR¶V Spain, 1940-1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),10-25; Richard Wigg, Churchill and Spain: The Survival of the 
Franco Regime, 1940-1945 (London: Routledge, 2005); Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London: Harper 
Collins, 1993), 461. On bribeV PDGH WR )UDQFR¶V JHQHUDOV GXULQJ WKH 6HFRQG :RUOG :DU VHH $QJHO Viñas, 
Sobornos. De cómo Churchill y March Compraron a los generales de Franco (Madrid: Critica, 2016); also see 
3HWHU'D\¶Vstudy of British intelligence during and after the Spanish Civil War, Franco¶V)ULHQGV+RZ%ULWLVK
Intelligence helped bring Franco to Power in Spain (London: Biteback Publishing Ltd., 2011) 
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FULWLFDO\HDUVRIEXWLQVWHDGDVDVXVWDLQHGVWUDWHJLFSURJUDPPH7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDW
%ULWLVKQRQLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ6SDLQZDVQRWVRPXFKDSROLF\RIµPDOHYROHQWQHXWUDOLW\¶WRZDUGV
WKH6SDQLVK/HIWEXWUDWKHUDVWKH&KLHIVRI6WDIIVXJJHVWHGRQHRIHQVXULQJWKHµEHQHYROHQW
QHXWUDOLW\¶ RI )UDQFR LQ OLJKW RI WKH JURZLQJ IDVFLVW WKUHDW LQ (XURSH 7KHUHIRUH WKLV
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVKLIWV WKHIRFXVRIRIILFLDO%ULWLVKSHUFHSWLRQVIURPWKH5HSXEOLFWR WKHUHEHOV
ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI DSSHDVHPHQW GHPRQVWUDWLQJ WKDW QRQLQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ 6SDLQ ZDV D
VLJQLILFDQWIDFHWRIZLGHU%ULWLVKIRUHLJQSROLF\:KHQ1HYLOOH&KDPEHUODLQUHSODFHG%DOGZLQ
DV%ULWLVK3ULPH0LQLVWHULQ0D\FRXUWLQJ)UDQFR¶VEHQHYROHQFHWKURXJKDSROLF\RIWDFLW
DSSHDVHPHQWEHFDPHWKHFRUHRI$QJOR6SDQLVKUHODWLRQV 
$PRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHWUHDWPHQWRIWKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDSSHDVHPHQWRI)UDQFR
GXULQJWKHFLYLOZDULVQHHGHGWRIXOO\DSSUHFLDWHWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRI%ULWLVKGLSORPDF\LQ6SDLQ
GXULQJWKLVSHULRG*LYHQWKHOLPLWHGVSDFHDYDLODEOHLQDMRXUQDODUWLFOHWKLVDUWLFOHOLPLWVLWVHOI
SULPDULO\WRWKHODVWVL[PRQWKVRIWKHFRQIOLFWLQ6SDLQDOWKRXJKHDUOLHUH[DPSOHVRIDSSHDVLQJ
)UDQFRDUHSURYLGHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKLVSROLF\ZDVDQRQJRLQJGHYHORSPHQWSURYRNHGE\
WKHSHUFHLYHGQHHGWRHQVXUHFRUGLDOUHODWLRQVZLWKZKLFKHYHUVLGHHPHUJHGYLFWRULRXVIURPWKH
FRQIOLFW 
 
Appeasement and Spain 
The concept of appeasement continues to be debated among historians.17 Critics in the 1930s 
and 1940s argued that the policy was naïve in its attempts to secure lasting peace in Europe 
through granting concessions to German expansionism.18 This idea was articulated in the late 
VE\:LQVWRQ&KXUFKLOOZKRZURWHWKDWµWKHDSSHDVHUV¶IDLOHGWRUHFRJQLVH+LWOHU¶VUHDO
LQWHQWLRQVDQGDVDUHVXOWRIµPLVFDOFXODWLRQVDQGPLVMXGJHPHQWVRIPHQDQGIDFWV¶SXUVXHGD
cowardly policy which ultimately condemned Britain to fight a war against Germany in 
unfavourable circumstances.19 This generalisation took on a prominence among early 
historians of appeasement who argued with the supposed benefit of hindsight.20 Revisionists in 
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the 1960s counter-argued that appeasement was a rational policy and arguably the most realistic 
one that could have been pursued. 21 Despite this central disagreement, orthodox and revisionist 
scholars of appeasement are united in their overwhelming focus on Anglo-German and Anglo-
Italian relations, with little focus on how appeasement worked with regards to countries of 
secondary strategic importance such as Spain.22  The example of British policy in Spain shows 
that non-intervention shared its aims with wider British foreign policy and was therefore 
consistent with the objectives of appeasement: avoiding war altogether or, if necessary, fighting 
a war under more favourable circumstances. 
Norrin Ripsman and Jack Levy have argued that appeasement was not just a policy of 
granting concessions to avoid war, but has been used for a number of purposes. They identify 
three types of general appeasement: (1) resolving grievances; (2) diffusing secondary threats; 
and (3) buying time. In µdiffusing secondary threats¶ Ripsman and Levy identify three 
subtypes:  
i. µ&RQVHUYLQJ UHVRXUFHV¶E\JUDQWLQJFRQFHVVLRQV WRD VHFRQGDU\DGYHUVDU\ WR IUHHXS
resources for use against a primary adversary; 
ii. µ'HQ\LQJDOOLHV¶WKURXJKDSSHDVLQJDVHFRQGDU\DGYHUVDU\WRNHHSLWIURPIRUPLQJDQ
alliance with a primary adversary or giving it military support; 
iii. µ5HGLUHFWLQJWKHWKUHDW¶DVWURQJHUYHUVLRQRIµGHQ\LQJDOOLHV¶ZKLFKLQYROYHVDSSHDVLQJ
a secondary adversary in order to redirect its hostility towards the primary threat.23  
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7KHµGHQ\LQJDOOLHV¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVXWLOLVHGLQ$QJOR-Italian relations after the Abyssinian crisis 
to keep Mussolini out of the German orbit.24 This strategy is perhaps more relevant when it 
comes to Spain. Indeed, in an important strategic location, there existed the potential for a right-
wing dictatorship to be established that would have close relations with the fascist powers 
which the BriWLVK*RYHUQPHQWZDVDSSHDVLQJ$VWKHFLYLOZDUSURJUHVVHGDQG)UDQFR¶VIRUFHV
captured more and more ground while the German and Italian governments poured more 
assistance into the Iberian Peninsula, it became increasingly evident that this would be the case.  
There are numerous examples of British appeasement of Franco during the civil war. 
British policy developed from trying to appear completely neutral at the beginning of the 
conflict towards directly appeasing Franco when his victory grew more certain. When the fall 
of Málaga to the rebels was imminent in February 1937, for instance, George Ogilvie-Forbes, 
the British Chargé G¶$IIDLUHVDVNHGWKH)RUHLJQ2IILFHIRUDQLQFUHDVHLQ%ULWLVKQDYDOVWUHQJWK
DURXQGWKHFLW\¶VZDWHUVWRµGLVVXDGHWKH>1DWLRQDOLVW@ insurgents from taking unduly drastic 
DFWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH FLW\ DQG LWV SRSXODWLRQ¶25 Two days later he reported that many of the 
150,000 who had fled due to fear of reprisals had been subjected to horrific shell fire and 
bombing.26 There was much discussion within the Foreign Office about how the British 
Government could help the Republican refugees fleeing Málaga. However, the decision not to 
LQWHUYHQH RQ D KXPDQLWDULDQ EDVLV ZDV XOWLPDWHO\ GHWHUPLQHG E\ µSROLWLFDO DQG SUDFWLFDO¶
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVDV)UDQFR¶VVhips were blockading the coast and the Foreign Office feared both 
the possibility of coming into conflict with them and appearing to favour the Spanish 
Government.27 This would appear to indicate a position of appeasing the rebels towards the 
beginning of the conflict, dominated by local concerns and the risk of direct conflict with 
)UDQFR¶VIRUFHV 
The British Government was put in a more difficult position after the notorious 
destruction of Guernica two months later. In the afternoon of 26 April 1937, German aircraft 
in liaison with Francoist officers destroyed the town of Guernica.28 The exact number of deaths 
that occurred as a result of the bombing is difficult to gauge, but Ralph Stevenson, the British 
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consul in Bilbao, estimated that Guernica at the time had a population of around 10,000. It was 
DOVR WKH WRZQ¶V ZHHNO\ PDUNHW GD\ ZKLFK DWWUDFWHG YLVLWRUV IURP RXWVLGH *XHUQLFD29 After 
visiting the town within twenty-four hours of its destruction, Stevenson provided Foreign 
SeFUHWDU\ $QWKRQ\ (GHQ ZLWK D KDUURZLQJ UHSRUW ZKLFK GHVFULEHG µPDQ\ PHQ DQG ZRPHQ
HUULQJWKURXJKWKHVWUHHWVVHDUFKLQJLQWKHZUHFNDJHRIWKHLUKRXVHVIRUWKHLUGHDURQHV¶DQGRI
the subsequent ruthless machine-gunning of those fleeing from the town to safety.30 
 Although Eden was disturbed by the deaths at Guernica, the greater concern for the 
%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWZDVWKDWLWSUHVHQWHGDFOHDUGHPRQVWUDWLRQRI*HUPDQ\¶VDLUSRZHUZKLFK
might one day befall Britain.31 The potential destruction that could be caused by aerial attacks 
in a future was a prevalent fear among British policy-makers in the 1930s. As Stanley Baldwin 
had IDPRXVO\VDLGLQµWKHERPEHUZLOODOZD\VJHWWKURXJK¶32 In the House of Commons 
on 6 May 1937, while he remained reluctant to cause any risk to Anglo-German relations by 
launching accusations, Eden expressed the view that the indignant response to the bombing 
ZDVGXHWRWKHNQRZOHGJHWKDWµLIWKDWNLQGRIWKLQJLVUHSHDWHGDQGLQWHQVLILHVRn a larger scale, 
LWLVJRLQJWRPHDQDWHUULEOHIXWXUHIRU(XURSHWRIDFH¶33 Indeed, he maintained in his memoirs 
WKDW WKHGHVWUXFWLRQRI*XHUQLFDKDGEHHQµWKHILUVWEOLW]RIWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU¶34 Thus 
Guernica can be interpreted as the start of a shift in British policy towards Spain, driven less 
by concerns of a local escalation of the conflict than the broader European strategic 
significance. The fact that stronger protest was not made indicates that the Foreign Office was 
already tacitly appeasing FUDQFR¶V FRDOLWLRQ DQG WKH GLUHFW LQYROYHPHQW RI WKH *HUPDQV
complicated matters further. 
On 29 April 1937 the rebels reached the burning remnants of Guernica and by June it 
became clear that Bilbao was going to fall into their hands.35  The Foreign Office was put in a 
difficult position by the possibility that the Basque Government (a regional government which 
had been granted autonomous rights in 1936) might request British naval help for an 
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evacuation.36 Stevenson told the Foreign Office of the likelihood that, in the event of Bilbao 
falling to the rebels, all prominent members of the Basque Government would be shot. Back in 
Whitehall, Foreign Office analyst William Montagu-Pollock noted that this was in fact likely 
WRKDSSHQGXHWRµRXUSUHYLRXVH[SHULHQFH RIWKHLQVXUJHQWV¶DWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKH%DVTXHVDQG
WRZDUGV KXPDQLWDULDQ FRQVLGHUDWLRQV LQ JHQHUDO¶ +RZHYHU D OLVW RI ERWK WKH SUDFWLFDO
difficulties and possible consequences of evacuating the Basques were drawn up. It was 
thought likely that should the Royal Navy offer assistance in evacuating members of the 
Basque Government, it would be difficult to justify leaving many others to their fate. The 
Foreign Office was also concerned that such a heavy reliance on British ships carried the risk 
of coming into direct conflict with Francoist ships that were endeavouring to blockade the 
coast.37 In the event, the Royal Navy escorted some ships evacuating refugees but the 
)UDQFRLVWVODPHQWHGWKDWWKLVµLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ZDVDQDWWDFNRQWKHSUHVWLJHRIWKHLUQDY\DQd the 
sovereignty of Spain. This diplomatic crisis would drastically affect the thinking of British 
officials when the question of evacuating Republicans arose in the future.38 
British neutrality was put under further strain throughout 1938. In particular, the 
continuous bombing of civilian areas in and around Republican Barcelona by Italian planes 
throughout March 1938 evoked indignation among British public opinion which Chamberlain 
felt was a threat to his efforts to find a settlement with Mussolini.39 The Times published 
detailed, almost daily reports on the air raids.40  Some verbal protests were made over the 
targeting of civilian areas but Franco insisted that his forces selected only military targets and 
WKDWLQ%DUFHORQDZKHUHPRVWRIWKH5HSXEOLF¶VUemaining war industry lay, armaments were 
stored in civilian areas.41 He also bemoaned that similar attacks carried out by Republican 
planes had not aroused such a response from Britain. Robert Hodgson, who had been appointed 
as the British representative to rebel Spain in November 1937, warned the Foreign Office that 
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in rebel territory there was growing ill-feeling towards the British Government due to this 
perceived media bias.42 
Even when British ships were being bombed by rebel aircraft, Chamberlain refused to 
do any more than issue a banal protest which he never intended, or at any rate hoped he would 
never have to, carry further. For instance, in the House of Commons in June 1938, Chamberlain 
admitted that some attacks on British ships had been deliberate. After being bombarded with 
TXHVWLRQVDVWRZK\KHGLGQRWGRPRUHLQUHVSRQVHKHVLPSO\VDLGWKDWKHZDVµDIUDLGWKDW
while war continues we must expect a succession of these incidents and of the horrors against 
which we have protested. The one satisfactory solution of the Spanish question would be a 
WHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHZDU¶43 In July, he said in the Cabinet that if Franco must continue to bomb 
VKLSVKHµPXVWXVHGLVFUHWLRQ¶RUKHPLJKWµDURXVHDIHHOLQJ>LQWKLVFRXQWU\@WKDWZRXOGIRUFH
the government WRWDNHDFWLRQ¶44 
&KDPEHUODLQ¶VSHUVRQDOIHHOLQJVZHUHH[SUHVVHGLQKLVSULYDWHOHWWHUV+HZURWHWRKLV
VLVWHU,GDRQ-XQHWKDWµLIRQO\ZHFRXOGJHWDQDUPLVWLFHDOOWKLVERPELQJRIFLYLOLDQVDQG
ships would cease and what suffering and misery would EHVDYHG¶45  Later in the month he 
ZURWHWRKLVRWKHUVLVWHU+LOGDWKDWKHKDGJRQHRYHUµHYHU\IRUPRIUHWDOLDWLRQ¶EXWLWZDVFOHDU
WKDWQRQHFRXOGEHHIIHFWLYHµXQOHVVZHDUHSUHSDUHGWRJRWRZDUZLWK)UDQFRZKLFKPLJKW
quite possibly lead to war with Italy and Germany and in any case cut right across my policy 
RIJHQHUDODSSHDVHPHQW¶46 Thus Chamberlain was always thinking about how policy in Spain 
DIIHFWHGKLVZLGHU IRUHLJQSROLF\DLPV%\ WKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFK WR WKH
Spanish conflict had evolved into a policy of tacitly appeasing Franco. Initially in order to 
avoid local escalation that would drag Britain into a European war, this was increasingly 
motivated by a desire to avoid entangling the thorny problem of Anglo-German and Anglo-
Italian relations with the situation in Spain and became more pronounced under Chamberlain.  
Searching for a solution  
In 1938 the British Government set up a prisoner exchange commission in Spain headed by 
Field Marshall Sir Phillip Chetwode. By negotiating prisoner exchanges and mediating 
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between the two parties, Chamberlain hoped to find a peaceful solution to the Spanish 
conflict.47 He also sought an international solution that would facilitate this and ensure peace 
in Europe. In late August he decided to go and meet Hitler personally in an attempt to improve 
Anglo-German relations. Despite the fact that Spain featured less in talks with Germany in the 
build up to the Munich Conference of September 1938, Chamberlain was still determined to 
bring about an armistice. Although more famous for settling the question of the Sudetenland in 
Czechoslovakia, Spain was a secondary issue at Munich, showing that the civil war was 
inherently linked to the general approach of conflict in Europe. When they met in September, 
Hitler assured Chamberlain that he had no territorial ambitions in Spain and that his reason for 
intervening on behalf of Franco was due to fears of Bolshevism and its potential to spread in 
Western Europe.48 Chamberlain informed Hitler of a conversation he had had the night before 
with Mussolini regarding Spain and a joint proposal to both sides for an armistice which Hitler 
said, as Mussolini had, he would consider.49  
Since July 1938, Franco had been engaged in the Battle of the Ebro where he 
demonstrated his complete disregard for how many lives were lost even on his own side.50 This 
angered Mussolini who told his Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, on 29 August to mark in 
KLVGLDU\µWRGD\«,SUHGLFW)UDQFR¶Vdefeat. This man does not know how, or does not want, 
WRPDNHZDU7KH5HGVDUHILJKWHUV)UDQFRLVQRW¶51 Mussolini did not hide his frustration at 
WKHFRQIHUHQFHLQ0XQLFK+HWROG&KDPEHUODLQWKDWKHZDVµIHGXS¶ZLWK6SDLQZKHUHKHKDG
µORVWPHQ GHDGDQGZRXQGHG¶DQGWKDWKHZDVµDQQR\HGZLWK)UDQFR¶ZKRµFRQWLQXDOO\
WKUHZDZD\DOOFKDQFHVRIYLFWRU\¶52 
&KDPEHUODLQ OHIW 0XQLFK IHHOLQJ RSWLPLVWLF DERXW WKH IXWXUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V GLSORPDWLF
relations with the fascist powers, although little real progress was made on the Spanish conflict. 
Meanwhile the Munich Agreement effectively ended any hopes the Republican Government 
had of eventually being aided by the British. Juan Negrín, the Republican Premier since May 
1937, had hoped that an escalation of the Czechoslovakian crisis would bring the western 
democracies into Spain on the side of the Republic and was therefore dismayed when an 
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agreement was reached. Franco too realised that an escalation of the Czechoslovakian crisis 
might have resulted in him losing the civil war as, in such an event, Russian and French aid for 
the Republic might have cut off rebel Spain from German and Italian supplies. Accordingly, 
when the British and French Governments enquired in September 1938 what Franco would do 
in the event of a general European war, he responded that he would remain neutral and his 
Foreign Minister, General Francisco Gómez-Jordana y Sousa, WROG5REHUW+RGJVRQRI)UDQFR¶V
µZDUPHVWIHHOLQJVRIV\PSDWK\IRU(QJODQG¶$IWHUWKHVLJQLQJRIWKH0XQLFK$JUHHPHQW, a 
UHOLHYHG)UDQFRVHQWKLVµZDUPHVWFRQJUDWXODWLRQV¶WR&KDPEHUODLQIRUKLVSUHVHUYDWLRQRISHDFH
in Europe. Franco was playing a duplicitous game and his loyalties still lay with the fascist 
regimes, but his attitude at this point must have evoked at least some optimism in British 
officials for the future of Anglo-Spanish relations. The policy of appeasing Franco to ensure 
his benevolent neutrality in a future conflict with fascism appeared to be achieving early 
success. However, his unwillingness to accept anything less than total victory over the Republic 
would remain a spanner in the works.53 
In the aftermath of Munich, Mussolini was still anxious for the ratification of the Anglo-
Italian Agreement under which he assured Chamberlain that he would begin withdrawing 
Italian troops from Spain and in return the British Government would use its influence in the 
League of Nations to bring about international recognition of the Italian conquest of 
Abyssinia.54 Ciano wrote in his diary on 2 October that he intended to call the British 
Ambassador at Rome, the Earl of Perth, the next day and officially tell him that Italy would 
withdraw 10,000 troops from Spain.55 By doing so, it was hoped that the agreement could be 
ratified and also that the British Government would grant Franco belligerent rights. While the 
agreement was ratified in November, Chamberlain wanted to use belligerent rights as a 
bargaining tool both with Franco and Mussolini to secure the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
and find a settlement, ideally in the form of an armistice.56 Thus, when 10,000 Italians were 
ZLWKGUDZQ IURP6SDLQ &KDPEHUODLQ UHJDUGHG WKH DPRXQW DV µQRW JRRGHQRXJK¶ DQG LQ WKH
Cabinet it was decided to still withhold belligerent rights.57  
                                                          
53
 Preston, Franco, 312-13, 323-43. 
54
 3DXO6WDIIRUGµ7KH&KDPEHUODLQ-+DOLID[YLVLWWR5RPH$5HDSSUDLVDO¶English Historical Review, 98 (1983) 
61-100 (63). 
55
 Ciano, diary entry 2 Oct. 1938, 137. 
56
 &KDPEHUODLQ¶VQRWHERRNHQWLWOHGµDIHZSROLWLFDOQRWHV¶QRGDWH, NC 2/25. 
57
 Cabinet Memorandam, 21 Oct. 1938, CAB 24/279/31. The British War Office estimated that in September 1938 
there were 41,000 Italians in Spain, see Edwards, 177-79. 
15 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVEHDULQJLQPLQG0XVVROLQL¶VGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK)UDQFR¶VSURJUHVVLQWKH
war as well as this step forward, it seemed like an opportune time for trying to work more 
closely with the Italians. Accordingly, Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, who had replaced Eden 
as Foreign Secretary in February 1938, began putting together plans for a visit to Rome. When 
this proposed visit was discussed in the Cabinet in late December 1938, it was assumed that 
the major topic of talks with Italy would be the Spanish issue and how to resolve it. 
Chamberlain VWDWHGKLV LQWHQWLRQZDV WRJHW µVRPHWKLQJ IRU VRPHWKLQJ¶ IURP0XVVROLQLDQG
argued that it ought to be suggested to him that the longer he gives help to Franco, the harder 
it will be to extricate himself in the long run.58 However, negotiations became more difficult 
GXULQJ WKH YLVLW ZKHQ QHZV FDPH LQ RI )UDQFR¶V PLOLWDU\ VXFFHVVHV IURP KLV DGYDQFH RQ
Catalonia.59 $V&KDPEHUODLQZURWHWRKLVVLVWHU,GDGXULQJWKHYLVLWµ,ZLOOEHYHU\JODGZKHQ
WKLV5RPHYLVLWLVRYHU¶DVµ)UDQFR¶VVXFFHVVHVKDYHFUHDWHGJUHDWGLIILFXOW\IRUXV¶60 Indeed, 
Mussolini was as adamant as ever for Franco to achieve a complete victory and urged him not 
WRDFFHSWµFRPSURPLVHVRUPHGLDWLRQVRIDQ\NLQG¶61 Mussolini was even willing to become 
more invoOYHG LI WKH ZDU VWDUWHG WR JR LQ WKH 5HSXEOLF¶V IDYRXU RU LI DQRWKHU JRYHUQPHQW
intervened on its behalf.62 As he told his Foreign Minister, Ciano, shortly after the British visit, 
µLI WKH)UHQFKDLG WKH5HGV ,ZLOO ODQGEDWWDOLRQVDW9DOHQFLDHYHQ LI Whis starts a world 
ZDU¶63 
 
Recognising Franco 
Chamberlain returned from Rome having achieved little in his meetings with the Italians and 
with the knowledge that Franco was even closer to achieving total victory over the Republic. 
Accordingly, he was encouraged to start thinking seriously about putting in place plans for 
UHFRJQLVLQJ)UDQFR¶VJRYHUQPHQW2ZHQ2¶0DOOH\D%ULWLVKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHDW+HQGD\HMXVW
RYHUWKH)UHQFKERUGHUDIILUPHGWKDWLWZDVLQ%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWVWRGRVRDQGWROGWKH)RUHLJQ
Office on 15 January 1939 that early recognition of Franco was essential if the British 
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*RYHUQPHQWZDQWHGµWRREWDLQDQDOO\DQGSOD\DODUJHSDUWLQWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI6SDLQ¶64 
+HUHZHFDQVHHWKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWSXWWLQJDµGHQ\LQJDOOLHV¶VWUDWHJ\LQto practice. This 
EHFDPH HYHQ PRUH SUHVVLQJ ZKHQ )UDQFR¶V IRUFHV HQWHUHG %DUFHORQD ODWHU WKDW PRQWK DQG
rendered the Republican war effort hopeless unless the western democracies abandoned the 
Non-Intervention Agreement.65 Negrín accepted that this was extremely unlikely and finally 
admitted defeat in early February 1939. He subsequently informed the British Government that 
the Republican army would surrender if Franco would agree to make formal declarations that 
Spain would remain an independent power and not be dominated by the fascist powers; that 
Spaniards would be free to choose their own form of government; and that military and political 
leaders would be free to leave the country while there would be no political reprisals for those 
who stayed. If these conditions were not met, Negrín said that the Republic would continue 
fighting.66  
The Foreign Office welcomed this proposal and requested Hodgson, the British 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH WR WKH UHEHOV WR HQTXLUH ZLWK )UDQFR¶V JRYHUQPHQW ZKHWKHU DQ DUUDQJHPHQW
could EH PDGH $W WKH VDPH WLPH KRZHYHU PHPEHUV RI )UDQFR¶V JRYHUQPHQW VDZ DQ
opportunity to apply pressure to bring about a swift recognition of their regime. General 
-RUGDQD )UDQFR¶V )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU WROG +RGJVRQ WKDW %ULWLVK DQG )UHQFK UHFRJQLWLRQ ZDV
immaterial to Franco but that its delay would have an effect on the duration of the war. Playing 
RQ%ULWLVKKXPDQLWDULDQFRQFHUQVDPHPEHURI)UDQFR¶VGLSORPDWLFVWDIIDOVRWROG(ULF3hipps, 
the British ambassador at Paris, that unless Britain recognised Franco he would launch an 
RIIHQVLYH µHQWDLOLQJ WKH VODXJKWHU RI WKRXVDQGV RI JRYHUQPHQW WURRSV¶67 Hodgson therefore 
ZDUQHG WKDWGHOD\V LQ UHFRJQLVLQJ)UDQFR¶V*RYHUQPHQWZRXOGRQO\EH WR WKHGHWULPHQWRI
Anglo-Spanish relations while simultaneously prolonging the conflict.68  
Delaying recognition was in direct contrast to the British desire to see an end to the war 
at the earliest possible moment. It also allowed more time for the German and Italian regimes 
to entrench themselves further in Spain while pressure on the British Government to bring an 
end to non-intervention was mounting among opponents of the policy.69 Calls for abandoning 
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non-intervention and aiding the Republic even came from within the Conservative Party. 
Vyvyan Adams, the vehemently anti-appeasement Conservative MP for Leeds West, appraised 
British policy in Spain for The Daily Telegraph. He criticised non-intervention for having 
allowed the governments of Germany and Italy to establish themselves in Spain and advocated 
aiding the Republic to prevent them from doing so any further.70 Adams received numerous 
letters congratulating him for speaking out on the policy. Halifax, however, responded to 
Adams personally, expressing his confusion as to why he would advocate taking an action 
ZKLFKZRXOGµJLYHULVHWRWKHYHU\VLWXDWLRQZKLFKQRQ-LQWHUYHQWLRQZDVGHVLJQHGWRSUHYHQW¶71 
Halifax was referring not only to the potential of escalating the conflict by siding with the 
Republic, but also to pushing Franco further into the arms of Hitler and Mussolini by doing so. 
The policy pursued by the British Government was designed to prevent such an alliance 
DQG LWZDVKRSHGHQVXUH)UDQFR¶VEHQHYROHQWQHXtrality in a future European war. Indeed, 
when Hodgson had been sent to enquire whether Franco would agree to those conditions laid 
out by Negrín, Chamberlain wrote that he would not allow delays in negotiations as it might 
prevent the British Government fURP µHVWDEOLVKLQJ H[FHOOHQW UHODWLRQV ZLWK )UDQFR ZKR DW
SUHVHQW VHHPVZHOOGLVSRVHG WRXV¶+HDOVRKRSHG WKDW µLI WKH ,WDOLDQVDUHQRW LQ WRREDGD
WHPSHUZHPLJKWJHW)UDQFR¶72  The Cabinet had already discussed earlier in the month that 
µVRORQJDV+LV0DMHVW\¶V*RYHUQPHQWPDLQWDLQHGLWVSUHVHQWDWWLWXGHWRZDUGV*HQHUDO)UDQFR¶V
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ>ZLWKKROGLQJUHFRJQLWLRQ@¶WKH\ZHUHµLPSRWHQWWRSURPRWHRQHRIWKHSULQFLSOH
purposes of British policy in Spain, namely, the effective combating of German and Italian 
LQIOXHQFHZLWKLQ*HQHUDO)UDQFR¶VUHJLPH¶73  Halifax had also argued in the Foreign Office 
WKDWLWµLVRISULPDU\LPSRUWDQFHWRHIIDFHDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOHWKHELWWHUQHVVDWSUHVHQWSUHYDLOLQJ
DJDLQVW+LV0DMHVW\¶V*RYHUQPHQWDPRQJ*HQHUDO)UDQFR¶VDGKHUHQWV¶DQGSODFHWKH%ULWLVK
LQDµIDUEHWWHUSRVLWLRQWKDQDWSUHVHQWWRFRPEDWE\GLSORPDWLFPHDQVWKHH[FHVVLYHLQIOXHQFH
RI*HUPDQ\DQG,WDO\RQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHHYROXWLRQRIWKHQHZ6SDLQ¶+HULJKWO\QRWHGWKDW
Germany and Italy would dislike µRXUEHODWHGELGWRVQDWFKIURPWKHPDQGVHFXUHWKHIUXLWVRI
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*HQHUDO)UDQFR¶VYLFWRU\¶EXWDOVRWKDWµWKHUHLVYHU\PXFKPRUHWREHJDLQHGWKDQWKHUHLVWR
EHULVNHGE\HDUO\UHFRJQLWLRQRI)UDQFR¶74 
Despite the urgency felt by Chamberlain and Halifax, they had not only brought to 
)UDQFR¶VDWWHQWLRQWKRVHFRQGLWLRQVODLGRXWE\1HJUtQEXWDOVRRIIHUHGWRDFWLQDPHGLDWRU\
capacity if they were accepted.75 Chamberlain wrote to his sister Hilda on 19 February that he 
ZDV µYHU\ KRSHIXO DERXW 6SDLQ¶ DIWHU KHaring that the Spanish Government was willing to 
VXUUHQGHULI)UDQFRZRXOGJLYHµUHDVRQDEOHDVVXUDQFHVDERXWUHSULVDOV¶76 However, unwilling 
to accept anything less than unconditional surrender, Franco rejected the proposal when it was 
brought to him.77 Accordingly, Pablo de Azcárate, the Republican ambassador at London, 
insisted that his government would adjust its conditions and surrender if only their clause 
regarding political reprisals was agreed. Halifax allowed time for this to first be approved by 
NeJUtQDQGDJUHHGWRWKHQEULQJLWWR)UDQFR¶VDWWHQWLRQ+RZHYHUQHLWKHUWKH)RUHLJQ2IILFH
nor Chamberlain was keen on there being any delays. When discussing the issue in the Cabinet, 
LWZDVDJUHHGWKDWLWZDVEHWWHUWRUHFRJQLVH)UDQFRµDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH¶EHFDXVHWKHORQJHU
UHFRJQLWLRQZDVKHOGEDFNµWKHOHVVYDOXHLWZLOOKDYHLQ)UDQFR¶VH\HV¶78 Chamberlain had 
ZULWWHQ WR KLV VLVWHU WKDW KH KDG µNHSW EDFN UHFRJQLWLRQ WR VHH LI ZH FDQ JHW WKLV VXUUHQGHU
DUUDQJHGDVFOHDUO\WKDWLVWKHEHVWRUGHU¶EXWexpressed categorically that he would not delay it 
if negotiations dragged on for too long.79 For reasons that are still not entirely clear, the message 
did not reach Negrín until it was too late and the British Government decided to press on with 
its recognition of Franco without any agreement in place.80  
Accordingly, focus shifted to the practicalities of recognising Franco and to what would 
EHFRPH RI %ULWDLQ¶V GLSORPDWLF UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH 5HSXEOLFDQ *RYHUQPHQW 7KLV LVVXH
presented further difficulties for the British Government because significant portions of 
southern and central Spain still remained under Republican control in early 1939.81 Admiral 
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C.G. Jarrett asked the Foreign Office a few days before the recognition of Franco if he was 
correct in assuming that recognition would be simultaneously withdrawn from the Republican 
Government when it was granted to Franco. He was informed that while de jure recognition 
would in fact be withdrawn, the Republic would continue to have de facto recognition over the 
territory still under its control.82 
This was just one of two possible courses outlined by the Foreign Office, and this policy 
of continuing to recognise the Republic as the de facto government in territory still under its 
control was subsequently thrown out. This course of action outlined to Jarrett had been 
UHJDUGHGDVWKHµEHVWRSWLRQRQDSUDFWLFDO OHYHO¶EHFDXVHWKHDOWHUQDWLYH± withdrawing any 
form of recognition from the Republic ± implied that the British Government viewed the 
Republic as merely µGLVRUJDQLVHGUHEHOV¶DQGFRQVLGHUHGWKHZDUWREHRYHU7KLVWKH)RUHLJQ
2IILFHEHOLHYHGZRXOGKDYHEHHQµQRGRXEWVDWLVIDFWRU\WR)UDQFREXWKDUGO\LQDFFRUGDQFH
ZLWKWKHSUDFWLFDOIDFWVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ¶8OWLPDWHO\KRZHYHUWKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWIound 
itself being forced into taking this approach.83 It was already feared that to acknowledging de 
facto UHFRJQLWLRQRIWKH5HSXEOLFLQVRPHSDUWVRI6SDLQZRXOGµDURXVH)UDQFR¶VUHVHQWPHQW¶
EXWWKHILQDOQDLOLQWKHFRIILQIRUWKH5HSXEOLF¶VGLSORPDWLFUelations with Britain came on 25 
February when Hodgson warned the Foreign Office that Franco would not even acknowledge 
UHFRJQLWLRQRIKLVJRYHUQPHQWXQOHVV WKH%ULWLVK µFRPSOHWHO\EUHDN WLHVZLWK WKH³5HGV´¶84 
Accordingly, Chamberlain decided that recognition would be withdrawn from the Republican 
*RYHUQPHQW+DOLID[EURNHWKHQHZVWR3DEORGH$]FiUDWHRQ)HEUXDU\WKDWµZHDUH
going to recognise Franco ± your diplomatic privileges must now come to an enG¶+HWKHQ
WROGWKH'XNHRI$OED)UDQFR¶VDPEDVVDGRUDW/RQGRQWKDW%ULWDLQLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKH
French, was going to recognise Franco and that a new British ambassador would be appointed 
in due course.85    
On Monday 27 February, the British and French Governments formally recognised 
)UDQFR¶V UHJLPH DV WKHRQO\ OHJLWLPDWHJRYHUQPHQW LQ6SDLQ%\ WKLVSRLQW)UDQFRDOUHDG\
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enjoyed full recognition of Germany, Italy, Portugal, Japan and the Vatican, among others.86 
Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that the decision had been made over the 
weekend, and backed up the decision with an explanation of the current military situation in 
Spain: 
As a result of the fall of Barcelona and overrunning of Catalonia, General Franco is 
now in control of the greater part of Spanish territory both on and beyond the mainland. 
Included in this territory are the most important industrial centres in Spain and the 
sources of most of her productions. Even if the Republican forces in the southern sector 
should continue to maintain some show of resistance, there can be no doubt now of the 
ultimate issue of the struggle, the prolongation of which can only result in further 
suffering and loss of life.87 
It is clear that the decision to recognise Franco was eased by the knowledge that his military 
victory was guaranteed and imminent. Some historians have suggested that the decision to 
grant unconditional recognition to Franco had been taken a few weeks earlier on 8 February 
but the decision to announce it publicly was put off.88 If Chamberlain justified recognising 
Franco on the premise that after the fall of Barcelona there was absolutely no possibility of 
anything other than a Francoist victory then this is plausible. At any rate, the British 
Government had certainly taken the decision to recognise Franco earlier than Chamberlain 
liked to admit. However, that it would be unconditional surrender clearly had not been fully 
decided as negotiating conditions, especially regarding reprisals, was clearly still on the table, 
as was the question of what would become of British diplomatic relations with the Republican 
Government. 
The Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, did not believe the decision had been made 
as recently as the weekend that had just passed and argued that simultaneously withdrawing 
recognition from the Republican Government while granting it to Franco was unjustifiable. He 
affirmed not only that the government of Juan Negrín was a legally elected one but that it was 
also still capable of fighting on and, with aid, could have defeated the rebels as it possessed an 
DUP\RIVRPHVROGLHUVµ7KRVHDUHQRWFRQGLWLRQV¶$WWOHHDVVHUWHGµZKLFKMXVWLI\WKH
recognition of General Franco either de facto or de jure, and certainly they do not justify the 
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taking away of reFRJQLWLRQIURP5HSXEOLFDQ6SDLQ¶89 Negrín had requested arms in October 
1938 and again in February 1939 and assured the British consul in Bilbao, Ralph Stevenson, 
that with them he would be able to turn the tide of the war.90 Of course, viewing Spain through 
the lens of his democratic socialist ideology, Attlee was not thinking of the practicalities of the 
situation.91 Only aid on an immense scale could have enabled the Republic to turn the situation 
around, and that is without considering how the German and Italian Governments would have 
responded.92 It will be recalled that Mussolini was more than willing to become more in 
involved in Spain in order to ensure that Franco won. 
Although many critics of British policy in Spain doubted whether German and Italian 
influence could be eradicated, Chamberlain and Halifax believed there was still time to do so 
and therefore the earlier they recognised Franco, the better. In defence of their policy, the 
Foreign Office drew up a list of assurances that the British Government had received from 
Franco, Mussolini and Hitler over the previous three years regarding the political independence 
of Spain.93 Chamberlain did not necessarily believe these assurances, but they remained one of 
the few tools at his disposal to combat domestic criticism. Nevertheless, there was little that 
FRXOGEHGRQHWRZHDNHQ)UDQFR¶VWLHVWRWKH,WDOLDQDQG*HUPDQUHJLPHVXQWLOUHFRJQLWLRQKDG
been granted as the first step in improving Anglo-Spanish relations. 
 
Abandoning Humanitarianism 
British humanitarian activities that helped supporters of the Republican Government had 
always met with a hostile reaction from the Francoists, as discussed previously with the cases 
of Málaga and the Basque country, and therefore a cautious attitude to humanitarianism was 
kept in place throughout the civil war. Accordingly, when the British Government had 
recognised Franco and hoped to establish a good relationship with the new Spain, it decided to 
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not only sever diplomatic ties with the Republic but also to wash its hands of humanitarian 
responsibilities.94  
Earlier in the civil war, Franco had put in place military tribunals which offered a façade 
of legitimacy to the repression being unleashed on Republicans and to project a better image 
of his regime abroad. In early 1939, along with assurances regarding the territorial integrity of 
6SDLQKHDOVRJDYHSXEOLFDVVXUDQFHVWKDWWKHUHZRXOGEHQRµSROLWLFDO¶UHSULVDOV95 As he did 
with assurances about German and Italian territorial ambitions in Spain, Chamberlain also tried 
to combat criticism of his lack of humanitarian considerations in his decision-making. He said 
LQWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQVWKDWWKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWKDGµQRWHGZLWKVDWLVIDFWLRQWKHSXEOLF
statements of General Franco concerning the determination of himself and his government to 
WDNHSURFHHGLQJVRQO\LQWKHFDVHVRIWKRVHDJDLQVWZKRPFULPLQDOFKDUJHVDUHODLG¶&OHPHQW
Attlee followed with a scathing attack on the fact that recognition had been given 
unconditionally and WKDW WKH RQO\ DVVXUDQFHV DJDLQVW SROLWLFDO UHSULVDOV KDG EHHQ µD PHUH
VWDWHPHQWIURP)UDQFRWKDWQRRQHH[FHSWODZEUHDNHUVZLOOEHGHDOWZLWK¶µ%XWWKHODZ¶$WWOHH
ZHQWRQµLVZKDW*HQHUDO)UDQFRPDNHVLW¶96  
Indeed, the British Government was well aware of the violent fate that awaited so many 
in Spain.97 Franco had issued the Law of Political Responsibilities on 13 February which 
ensured that anybody who had supported the Republic after October 1934 could be considered 
a criminal and anybody who had fought for the Republic during the civil war was guilty of 
military rebellion.98 Before the Law of Political Responsibilities, the British Government had 
estimated that there were at least 50,000 persons in the south of Spain who were in danger of 
their lives on account of their political or military activities if captured by the rebels.99 Aside 
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from those in the south, it was recognised that hundreds of thousands more were in territory 
from which escape was possible.100 Already by the end of February, the French Government 
had taken in some 300,000 Spanish women, children and elderly men at a considerable daily 
cost but many more were expected to flee across the border.101  
The French Government, however, was much more willing to assist in their evacuation 
than the British Government which was trying to maintain its impartial stance in order to 
appease Franco. In early February Eleanor Rathbone, an independent MP, had asked whether 
the government would be willing to admit Spanish Republican officials whose lives were in 
GDQJHULQWKHHYHQWRI)UDQFR¶VYLFWRU\*HRUJH0ounsey, a Foreign Office Assistant Under-
Secretary prevaricated, avoiding making an executive decision by replying that an 
interdepartmental meeting needed to be held to discuss the issue before giving an official 
answer. Mounsey suggested to his colleagues that Spanish refugees ought to be categorised 
into two types: non-combatants and combatants. He hoped that most of the former would return 
to Spain but recognised the possibility that considerable numbers would not and therefore 
EHFRPHµPRUHRUOHVVDSHUPDQHQWOLDELOLW\¶7KHµFRPEDWDQWV¶ZHUHEHOLHYHGWREHLQµDQHYHQ
ZRUVHSOLJKW¶EXW0RXQVH\DUJXHGWKDW WKHUHZHUHµREYLRXVREMHFWLRQVWRGHDOLQJZLWKWKHLU
FDVHRQRUGLQDU\FKDULWDEOHOLQHV¶$WDQ\UDWHLWZDVKRSHGWKDWWKH)UHQFK*RYHUQPHQWZRXOG
continue handling the issue without much of a commitment from Britain.102 
The French Government had in fact already asked for British assistance in the 
maintenance of Spanish refugees but received a non-committal reply.103 Although the Foreign 
Office had in the past been willing to assist in the evacuation and maintenance of refugees to a 
certain extent, it avoided going beyond a point from which its impartial attitude towards the 
civil war could be challenged.104 This remained the case in early 1939. For instance, when 
Republican officials in Madrid requested assistance for evacuating between 5,000 and 10,000 
persons wishing to leave Spain, the Foreign Office made a list of the pros and cons of offering 
assistance. Humanitarianism was the main factor in favour and it was pondered whether Franco 
might be happy for the British Government to do so since it would reduce the number of 
GLVVLGHQWVZLWKLQKLVUHJLPH+RZHYHUUHFDOOLQJ)UDQFR¶VUHVHQWPHQWRYHU%ULWLVKHYDFXDWLRQV
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of refugees in the past which he considered a form of intervention, it was feared that doing so 
again was likely to arouse the same resentment.105   
In early 1939 the Foreign Office recognised some additional reasons for not assisting 
with evacuations. Firstly, the situation was considered far less manageable due to the numbers 
that were now likely to leave Spain. The British consul in Valencia, Abbington Gooden, 
received enquiries from Spanish officials regarding the possibility of their evacuation in the 
event of the rebels capturing the rest of Spain. He was informed that no Spaniards were to be 
evacuated unless they formed part of an exchange commission or were in immediate danger 
because the numbers were expected be so vast that it was not possible to help more than a 
µVPDOOIUDFWLRQRIWKHP¶106   
Secondly, there was a concern in the Foreign Office that such assistance might prolong 
the war. On the one hand, it was possible that if those still fighting knew they were able to 
escape Spain safely, the assistance in doing so would encourage them to give up the fight and 
bring an end to the war sooner. On the other hand, however, it could also have encouraged 
many to continue fighting if they knew that if their efforts failed they would simply have been 
able to escape on a British ship.107 Indeed, the Foreign Office urged British consuls in Spain 
QRW WR JLYH 5HSXEOLFDQV SURPLVHV FRQFHUQLQJ HYDFXDWLRQV EHFDXVH LW ZDV IHOW WKDW µWKH
H[SHFWDWLRQRIEHLQJDEOHWRJHWDZD\RQD%ULWLVKZDUVKLSDWWKHODVWPRPHQW¶ZRXOGHQFRXUDJH
many to continue fighting.108 Although this reluctance to offer any substantial assistance in 
evacuating refugees resulted in many being unable to leave Spain, the British stance was 
determined by the core objectives of non-intervention: bringing a war to an end as soon as 
possible and establishing good relations with the victor. 
 
Conclusion 
There was continuity in British policy in Spain from the summer of 1936 through to the end of 
the civil war in 1939 and beyond.109 It has been suggested by Moradiellos that British policy 
in Spain was subordinated to appeasement only after it became clear that the war would be a 
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prolonged one and Germany and Italy became heavily involved.110 This article has 
demonstrated that the wider programme of general appeasement in Europe was always an 
integral part of British policy in Spain. First and foremost, the British Government wanted to 
avoid war in Europe. British officials recognised, of course, that war was a real possibility and 
therefore better conditions needed to be created to facilitate fighting in one. Throughout the 
civil war, the British Government became increasingly aware of the fact that Franco would 
eventually win and, as the prestige of the German and Italian regimes was bound up with 
)UDQFR¶V XOWLPDWH YLFWRU\ WKH %ULWLVK UHDOLVHG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WUHDGLQJ OLJKWO\ LQ their 
diplomatic relations with his government. In this regard, it appears unlikely that fears of a 
communist regime being established in Spain, as Little has argued, or a marked preference for 
a rebel victory, as Moradiellos suggests, had a significant influence on the formation or 
maintaining of British non-intervention, despite the personal sympathies of many British 
Conservatives at the time.111 
Indeed, comparisons can be drawn between non-intervention in Spain, and more 
specifically the reluctance to aid the Republic, and British policy towards Czechoslovakia in 
 DQG  DW OHDVW LQ WHUPV RI &KDPEHUODLQ¶V DWWLWXGH DQG GLSORPDWLF UHVSRQVH For 
LQVWDQFH DV +LWOHU¶V LQWHQWLRQV IRU &]HFKRVORYDNLD EHFDPH PRUH HYLGHQW during 1938, 
Chamberlain offered his assistance to Hitler in bringing about an armistice to prevent Germany 
taking military action. As Hitler was interested in improving Anglo-German relations, they 
came to the agreement, along with France and Italy, of annexing portions of Czechoslovakia 
that had a German-majority population.112 Chamberlain had said as early as March 1938, six 
months before the Munich Agreement, WKDWµ\RXRQO\KDYHWRORRNDWWKHPDSWRVHHWKDWQRWKLQJ
that France or we could do could possibly save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the 
*HUPDQVLIWKH\ZDQWHGWRGRLW«WKHUHIRUHZHFRXOGQRWKHOS&]HFKRVORYDNLD± she would 
VLPSO\EHDSUHWH[WIRUJRLQJWRZDUZLWK*HUPDQ\¶113 ,WZLOOEHUHFDOOHGWKDW&KDPEHUODLQ¶V
attitude towards the bombing of British ships in the summer of that year evoked similar 
ODQJXDJHZKHQKHWROGKLVVLVWHUWKDWKHKDGµJRQHRYHUHYHU\IRUPRIUHWDOLDWLRQ¶EXWQRWKLQJ
he could do would work unless he was willing to abandon his policy of appeasement and go to 
war with the dictators.114 Certainly, there were significant legal, political, diplomatic and 
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geostrategic issues that set British policies in Czechoslovakia and Spain apart, but 
&KDPEHUODLQ¶VDWWLWXGHLQERWKFDVHVZDVFOHDUO\GHWHUPLQHGE\KLVUHVROYHWRXSKROGWKHSROLF\
of appeasement and avoid conflict. 
In Spain, Chamberlain sought an armistice and offered to act as an intermediary 
between the two sides. When this was rejected by Franco, the Foreign Office considered 
offering de facto recognition of the Republican Government in areas of Spain still under its 
control but abandoned this idea when it was, unsurprisingly, also rejected Franco. Thus the 
policy of appeasement in Spain determined that Franco would have the unconditional 
recognition of the British Government. When Hitler violated the Munich agreement in March 
1939 and invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia, just as when Franco rejected all proposals 
for any form of conditional surrender, there was very little the British Government could do 
without resorting to military action. Rather than a fear of the spread of communism forcing the 
%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWLQWRDGRSWLQJµPDOHYROHQWQHXWUDOLW\¶SUDJPDWLFQHXWUDOLW\LQUHVSRQVHWR
the threat posed by the rise of fascism arguably had a more significant impact on the adoption 
and development of British neutrality in Spain.  
This also highlights the extent to which Anglo-Spanish relations were not simply a case 
of a Great Power directing its policy towards a smaller power: the British accepted that Franco 
possessed considerable agency and his approval had to be courted, not taken for granted. Whilst 
KLVWRULDQVRIWKHµPDOHYROHQWQHXWUDOLW\¶VFKRROIRFXVRQ%ULWLVKLQLWLDWLYHDQG6SDQLVKUHDFWLRQ
by linking the Spanish conflict with wider appeasement, this new interpretation shows instead 
that British neutrality was not just a one-way policy but equally about ensuring reciprocal 
benevolent neutrality from Franco. 
Ultimately, British self-interest took precedence over anything else in Spain. 
Regardless of British attitudes to either side in the civil war, the British Government from the 
beginning to the end of the conflict wanted to ensure that the war did not escalate into a wider 
European conflict. Assuming this objective would be achieved, ensuring that whatever 
government emerged in Spain would adopt a benevolent neutrality in a future European war 
was deemed essential. A policy of neutrality offered the best means of doing this. Not only did 
it entail fewer risks of military conflict, but it also allowed for the British Government to 
continue its wider policy of general appeasement in Europe while putting it in a position from 
which it could develop cordial relations with whichever side emerged from the conflict in 
Spain. As the civil war progressed and it became increasingly clear to the British Government 
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WKDW)UDQFRZRXOGZLQWKLVµGHQ\LQJDOOLHV¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVDEOHWREHgradually put into practice 
and would remain at the core of Anglo-Spanish relations in the aftermath of the civil war and 
during the Second World War.  
 
